That is, such philosophers acknowledge that the naïve realist account of perceptual phenomenology can’t be extended beyond veridical perceptual experiences, but they insist that this is as it should be. Since denying that perceptual errors occur would seem to be implausible, the apparent inability of naïve realism to allow for their occurrence has led many to reject the theory out of hand.Ī number of philosophers have recently claimed that naïve realists can resolve the problem posed by perceptual error by adopting disjunctivism. And in cases of hallucination it seems to you that you perceive an object when there is no appropriate object that you perceive-but you can only be perceptually acquainted with objects that exist. When you suffer an illusion the object you perceive doesn’t instantiate some of the properties you perceive it as instantiating-but you can only be perceptually acquainted with some property so long as the object you perceive actually instantiates that property. However, there is a cost associated with this account: naïve realism seems unable to allow for perceptual error. Consequently, the naïve realist can say that you seem to be presented with the object just as it is at that moment because you are presented with the object just as it is at that moment. More specifically, naïve realism is the view that when you perceive a particular object, the phenomenology of your perceptual experience is constituted by your standing in the acquaintance relation to that object and certain of its properties. The naïve realist characterizes the phenomenal character of such an experience-what it’s like for you to have it-in terms of a primitive, non-representational relation of awareness or acquaintance. One might think that naïve realism provides a particularly satisfying account of this fact. When you have a perceptual experience of a given object you seem to be presented with that object just as it is at that moment. I argue that neither account is satisfactory and that, consequently, naïve realism ought to be rejected. The second appeals to an unusual look or appearance that the perceived object instantiates. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from perceiving properties you would ordinarily perceive and subsequently form a mistaken judgment about the perceived object. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error.
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